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fueled by external factors. Our empirical results suggest that Lebanon is extremely unequal
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power in explaining armed conflict. A transition towards a fully fledged democracy would
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I. Introduction
Whereas sectarian power sharing might have proven successful in preventing domestic conflict
in a number of countries, it failed in Lebanon. Neither could consociationalism prevent a 16-year
lasting civil war beginning in 1975, nor could a modified version of it, which was re-negotiated
in 1989, eliminate Lebanon’s internal and external conflict risk. In this paper we argue that
Lebanon’s consociationalism is the culprit of this instability, not the solution. Lebanon has been
trapped by sectarian based consociationalism, which has rendered it greatly vulnerable to
destabilizing outside shocks. Only a transition towards a full fledged secular democracy that
mandates greater political accountability and economic governance and promotes increased
equality of access to economic opportunities would permit Lebanon to build immunity against
destabilizing external influences emanating from its geopolitical position. In this paper we focus
on the role of economic inequality in contributing to Lebanon’s vulnerability
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section two discusses Lebanon’s
consociationalism as a fragile political model. A brief review of the causes of Lebanon’s civil
war and their links to consociationalism follows in section three. Section IV assesses empirically
how the failure of the country’s consociational system to reduce vertical and horizontal
inequality was a contributing factor to war likelihood. Section V concludes with a summary of
our major findings and outlook.
II. Lebanon’s Consociationalism: A Fragile Political Model
The basic argument for consociationalism, as opposed to a simple majority rule, is that it
prevents the outbreak of open conflict in socially heterogeneous societies (see Lijphart, A., 1984,
Andeweg, R., 2000). Moreover, in places where domestic conflicts arise, especially in
developing countries, a consociational form of democracy is more likely to restore lasting peace
(see Binningsbo, H. M., 2005). However, there are many cases of failed consociationalism. For a
review of some prominent cases see Schneckener (2002).
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Ethnically, Lebanon is virtually homogenous. Yet, on the eve of independence in 1943, its
population was divided almost equally between Christians and Muslims. These religious
communities are further broken down to 18 recognized religious sects with three principal
communities: Maronite Christians, Sunni, and Shi’a Muslims. In theory, therefore, Lebanon was
a good candidate for adopting the consociational model. The three principal communities gained
the most political power with clear advantages being initially accorded to the Maronites. This
was to assure that the political supremacy they enjoyed under the French mandate would not
diminish after independence.
Article 95 of Lebanon’s 1943 constitution stated that for a temporary but unspecified period,
religious communities would be equitably represented in public employment and cabinet posts.
The principle of equitable representation was not defined. An unwritten national accord reached
among political leaders on the eve of independence specified that the president would be
Maronite, the speaker of the house Shia, and the prime minister Sunni. The president appointed
the prime minister and cabinet members and could, with the approval of the council of ministers,
dissolve the parliament. Under the national accord, Christians enjoyed a 5 to 4 majority in
parliament.
A sectarian formula has been assiduously applied to cabinet posts among the three largest
religious communities followed by the other communities. Depending on the cabinet size, other
officially recognized small communities may or may not be represented but an equal balance
between Christians and Muslims has always been maintained. Under the sectarian power sharing
formula, individual citizens from different religious communities, while assuming the same
obligations vis-à-vis the state, enjoy unequal political rights. Different standards also pertain to
personal status laws of marriage, divorce and inheritance, which fall under the jurisdiction of the
official bodies of the respective religious communities.
Maintaining a sectarian balance implied that no single political or religious group, or the army,
could impose its hegemony or ideology on the society. With the exception of the civil war
period, this helped foster civil liberties such as freedom of speech, media plurality, and
parliamentary elections.
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At the same time, the dictum of the delicate sectarian balance led to the emergence of a weak
state that failed to implement effective political and administrative programs. For example,
serious social policy reforms initiated by President Fouad Chehab in 1958–59 to promote
improved public sector performance and greater equality largely failed to take hold. This was
due to opposition by entrenched politico-sectarian special interests that feared redistributive
reforms.
Provoked by the fall of the pro-Western monarchy in Iraq in 1958 and the unification of Egypt
and Syria as the United Arab Republic, a limited civil conflict broke out between pro- and anti-
Western factions in Lebanon. Its settlement resulted in President Chehab assuming the
presidency as a compromise candidate. Although minor, this conflict already demonstrated the
country’s vulnerability to outside events. Yet, the most crucial moment was clearly the 1967
Arab-Israeli war and the resulting influx of Palestinian refugees. The 1967 war and the
Palestinian problem created a political and economic shock that Lebanon could not absorb or
accommodate peacefully, which, combined with its religious divisions, eventually paved the way
for the outbreak of the civil war in 1975.
The war was formally settled by the Taif Accord in 1989, which was brokered in the Saudi city
of Taif, following diplomatic efforts by Saudi Arabia and Western powers. It was incorporated in
the Lebanese Constitution in 1990. The Accord led to a more balanced sectarian formula of
power sharing, a long standing demand of the Muslim community in the pre-war years. For
example, it established parity in parliamentary representation between the Christian and Muslim
communities. During the Taif negotiations, there was not a single political actor who could have
advocated immediate political reforms towards a full fledged democracy. Nonetheless the Taif
Accord included a provision that allowed for the establishment of a national body whose task
would be to look into the elimination of the confessional nature of the system. Until today this
body has not been established, leaving the country hostage to sectarian strangleholds. Although
the Taif Accord led to a settlement of the civil war, Lebanon has yet to tackle the major problems
of the sectarian system with its inherent negative impact on economic and social development.
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In addition, the Taif Accord allowed for the temporary stationing of Syrian troops in Lebanon to
help re-establish order. In effect, they remained until April 2005 when, following the
assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri on February 14, they were forced to
withdraw under Western pressure and recurring street demonstrations. Throughout their stay,
Syria’s political interests dictated how the domestic politico-sectarian balance was to be
maintained, and how simmering political differences were to be resolved. This was done
irrespective of whether or not their resolution was in concurrence with the provisions of the Taif
Accord.
After the withdrawal of Syria, the country slid into a deep national political crisis with two major
opposing political camps vying for power. The first included the opposition parties Hizbullah
and Amal (both Shi’a) and the National Free Movement (primarily Maronite), along with allies
from various religious groups. The second comprised pro-government parties, including the al
Mustaqbal (Future) Movement (Sunni), the Progressive Socialist Party (Druze), the Lebanese
Forces (Maronite) and their allies.
Similar to the civil war experience, each camp has been again supported by foreign powers that
seek to promote their own regional political agenda. The crisis intensified especially after the
Israeli onslaught of July 23, 2006 that followed the capture of two Israeli soldiers by Hizbollah
in a cross border raid. It lasted until August 14 of that summer and followed the UN Security
Resolution 1701 of August 11, 2006 that called for a cease fire (but not heeded until a few days
later) and for a substantial enhancement of UN peace keeping forces in South Lebanon. In
addition to the loss of human lives and damage to its economic base, Lebanon sank further in the
quagmire of regional and international political rivalries.
The period that followed the summer 2006 war witnessed rising political tensions between the
two camps. A government crisis provoked by resignations of the opposition cabinet ministers led
to a de facto closure of Parliament for several months. It was occasioned by a constitutional
dispute between the government and opposition, prolonged strikes in downtown Beirut, huge
demonstrations and counter demonstrations, and the inability to agree on a successor to the
president when his term ended on November 22, 2007. All factors together brought the county to
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the verge of renewed civil conflict in the first week of May, 2008. Only after renewed Arab
league mediation efforts, led by Qatar, the protagonists could agree on a settlement of their
dispute. The so-called Doha agreement of August 15, 2008 was a compromise settlement -
though more in favor of the opposition parties - that specified the immediate election of the chief
of the army as the compromise presidential candidate, the formation of a new government with
an agreed upon division of cabinet seats between the two camps, and the modification of the
electoral law that had been a demand mainly of the Christian opposition. The new president of
the republic was elected on May 25, 2008 and a new government was formed shortly afterwards
(for a more detailed review of these developments see Makdisi, Kiwan and Marktanner, 2010).
As of this writing, the country awaits the outcome of the parliamentary elections scheduled for
June 7, 2009. Whatever the outcome, we argue that as long as the present sectarian model stays
in place, Lebanon will remain vulnerable to destabilizing external threats. We agree with Hudson
(1997) that Lebanon’s precarious political system can only be resolved by transiting from the
present consociational sectarian model to a full fledged secular democracy.
III. Causes of the Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1990: A Brief Review
Lebanon is home to a substantial part of the factors that dominate the literature on the causes of
civil conflict. This literature focuses mainly on the concepts of greed, often associated with the
exploitation of natural resource wealth, and grievance, generally the result of poverty, political,
economic and social inequities (see Collier P. and Hoefler A., 2004; Collier, P. and Sambanis,
N., 2005; Berdal, M. and Malone D. M., 2000; Arnson C. J. and Zartman I.W., 2005; UNCTAD,
2004). The interaction of social, ethnic and sectarian heterogeneity with economic factors
incorporates a particularly strong conflict risk (Keen, D., 2000; Sambanis, 2000; and Reynal-
Querol, M. 2002). However, the complexity of the causes of civil conflicts is not limited to greed
and grievance and their interaction with social factors. External intervention is another important
cause of conflict as well as its duration (see for example Elbadawi I. and N. Sambanis N., 2000).
Economic factors did not play a decisive role in the onset of the Lebanese civil war. In fact,
shortly before the civil war, Lebanon had a vibrant merchant class, comparatively high per capita
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incomes, an economy growing at considerable rates, and expanding employment opportunities.
These conditions weaken the economic causes for civil conflict. Yet, economic development was
regionally and horizontally highly unequal. Rural regions with Shi’a dominance were generally
the poorest. Regional economic disparities in income distribution led to migration from rural to
urban centers and to an unchecked and rapid growth of poor suburbs around major cities,
particularly Beirut.
The overlap of economic inequality with sectarian divisions had political consequences. For
example, in 1974 the religious leader of the Shi’a community, Imam Musa al Sadr, launched the
Amal movement. Mobilizing political support with the objective of enhancing the lagging
political but especially economic status of the Shi’a community in the country, Amal presented
itself as a movement of the dispossessed. A second goal of Amal was to act as a countervailing
force to the growing influence of Palestinian organizations in South Lebanon. After 1982, it grew
into one of the major warring factions in the Lebanese civil war.
Thus while the primary causes of the civil war might have related to domestic political
grievance, simultaneously fed and exploited by external powers in pursuit of their own regional
agendas (Makdisi and Sadaka, 2005), prevailing economic inequalities also played a role , as we
demonstrate below, by contributing to a high level of war likelihood.
Muslim political leaders regularly articulated political grievance issues and called for more equal
power sharing with the Christians and economic benefits, including greater access to public
sector employment as well as opportunities to participate in or control private economic
enterprises. Yet, as the Maronite establishment regularly resisted such calls, fearing the loss of
political power, coalition building with external parties in support of domestic agendas followed.
In turn, external parties exploited domestic political conflict to further their own interests.
The external factors, which placed increasing strains on the Lebanese political system, were
related to the rising military power of resident Palestinian political and military organizations,
particularly after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. While their activity was directed at keeping the
Palestinian cause alive, these organizations’ presence became intricately linked to Lebanese
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domestic political affairs. The domestic and regional political agendas could hardly be separated.
The prevailing weaknesses of the sectarian system were exploited by Palestinian organizations to
strengthen their political and military positions. For this purpose, they forged alliances with
disenchanted Lebanese sectarian (Muslim) and non-sectarian (leftist and nationalist) political
parties. They regarded such alliances a means to pressure the Maronite political establishment to
accept political reforms and greater sharing of economic opportunities. These developments
inevitably invited external interventions, most notably by Syria and Israel, both of which had
their own respective regional political agendas. Thus Lebanon became increasingly vulnerable to
outside destabilizing influences.
IV. An Empirical Approach to Lebanon’s Consociational Trap
Our main argument is that consociationalism has failed in Lebanon, thus helping pave the way
towards the civil war. There are major aspects to this failure. Our focus here is on one major
aspect, namely how the failure of Lebanon’s conscociational system to reduce the level of
inequality, if not actually increasing, has contributed to raising the level of the country’s
vulnerability to war. We approach this hypothesis empirically from a cross-sectional perspective
as follows. First, we argue that if Lebanon’s consociational model had succeeded, it should have
aligned Lebanon’s vertical inequality much more with its general level of economic
development. We though suspect that Lebanon’s level of inequality is statistically significantly
greater than what is predicted by its political and economic level of development, bearing in
mind that vertical inequality has also a strong horizontal dimension. If indeed there is empirical
evidence for an equality deficit, which we argue is a major indicator for democracy failure, the
question we then would like to address pertains to the role this equality deficit plays in
explaining Lebanon’s war likelihood.
In order to tackle this question, we build a panel dataset that consists of all countries in the world
for which observations were available in the 2005 World Bank Development Indicator Database.
For each country, nine observations are taken, corresponding to eight consecutive five-year
averages beginning with the 1961-1965 period and ending with the one of 1996-2000 as well as
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the four-year average of the 2001-2004 period. Averages were chosen in order to smooth out the
observations and to obtain a more balance panel dataset. Table 1 summarizes data and sources.
Table 1: Data and Sources
Variable Description Source
Per Capita Income
(Income)
Per capita income in 2000 USD, natural
log
2005 World Bank Development
Indicator Database (WDI).
Polity
Polity 2 Score; ranges between -10 and
+10 with higher scores indicating greater
democratic practices.
Gurr, Marshall, and Jaggers (2007),
Polity IV Dataset.
Inequality
Estimated Household Income Inequality
Indicator. Reads like Gini-coefficient.
Missing values were estimated using
ARIMA (1,0,0) forecasting.
University of Texas Income Inequality
Data Project (UTIP)
Muslim-Christian
Polarization
(MCP)
Likelihood of obtaining a Muslim and a
Christian in two random drawings from
population. Assumed to be constant.
Calculated using data from the World
Christian Encyclopedia.
Regional Oil (LnRegOil)
Population-weighted fuel exports as a
percentage of GDP per region (natural
log)
Regional Polity (RegPoL) Population-weighted Polity score per
region
2005 World Bank Development
Indicator Database (WDI).
Regional Refugee Density
(LNRegRefDens)
Regional average refugee densities
(refugees per 100,000, natural log)
WDI for non Palestinian refugees and
United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East (UNRWA).
War Country
(WarCtry)
Dummy for a country that experienced at
least one year of armed conflict during the
observations.
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)
and International Peace Research
Institute, Oslo (PRIO): Armed Conflicts
Dataset.
We specify the following pooled OLS equation
i5i4i3i2i10i LnRegOilβRegPolβMCPβPolityβIncomeββInequality +++++=
ii7i6 εDummyLebanonβnsLnRegRefDeβ +++ (1)
and logistic regression
( )
+++++=





i4i3i2i10
i
i RegPolβMCPβPolityβIncomeββ)CountryWarP(No
CountryWarPLN
ii7i6 εnsLnRegRefDeβLnRegOilβ +++ (2)
We begin with a discussion of equation (1), whose results are summarized in Table 2.
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The regression results of Table 2 show that income, political development, the regional
economic structure and regional refugee density are significant explanatory factors of inequality.
All coefficients carry the expected sign except for refugee density. Thus, higher incomes and
more advanced democratic practices reduce inequality while the presence of high regional oil
rents, which is an indicator for the lack of economic diversification, undermine equitable social
development. Counter-intuitively though, higher refugee densities correlate inversely with
inequality, which most probably captures the fact that richer and more equal countries are more
likely to host more refugees. Regional polity is not robust although it carries the expected sign.
Neither is the Muslim-Christian polarization variable a significant explanatory variable.
The most important result of Table 2 is that the Lebanon dummy is highly significant, indicating
that Lebanon’s level of income inequality is roughly 11 points higher than predicted. Yet, it is
important to note that the Estimated Household Income Inequality Dataset did not have an
observation for Lebanon. Gates (1998, p. 143), however, documents a Gini coefficient of 53.7
for 1960. For the year 1997, the Food and Agricultural Organization (online) lists Lebanon with
a Gini coefficient of 56. We therefore assumed for Lebanon a value of 53 for all observations,
which is probably a rather conservative estimate.
Turning to equation (2), whose results are summarized in Table 3, among the determinants
explaining whether a country is a war country, per capita income, polity, and inequality are the
only significant variables. Thus, as per capita incomes, democratic practices, and equality
increases, the likelihood of being a war country decreases. This, of course, does not mean that
regional factors are not relevant in the case of Lebanon. The opposite has been qualitatively
discussed in the previous sections. It simply states that they are not significant from a cross-
sectional perspective.
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With the war country equation at hand, we can next elaborate more on how Lebanon is
trapped by consociationalism. To illustrate this we use the parameters of Model III,
which is the most parsimonious, in order to estimate the likelihood of being a war country
according to
))Polity0.04Income0.37Ineq0.06(1.19Exp(1
1CtryWarLikelihood
iii
i
−−+−+
= (3)
We begin by estimating Lebanon’s war country likelihood using some stylized facts that
roughly characterize Lebanon in 1975, the year the civil war erupted. Assuming a per
capita income level of 4,000 (in 2000 USD), an inequality indicator of 53, and a polity
score of 4, Lebanon’s likelihood of being a war country is 70.4%. If Lebanon’s equality
deficit had been dismantled and been 42 instead of 53, the war country likelihood would
be 56.4%. Had Lebanon been additionally a full democracy with a polity score of 10,
which implies the overcoming of the confessional system, the war likelihood would have
been 50.5%. Thus, from a cross-sectional perspective, Lebanon could reduce its war
country likelihood by almost 20 percentage points, had it dismantled its equality deficit
and advanced democratization to a fully fledged democracy. Lastly, had Lebanon’s per
capita income been $5,000, its war country likelihood would have been below 50%. At
least from a statistical perspective, Lebanon is thus substantially trapped in a situation
with a high war likelihood, which can be attributed to the system’s inability to reduce
prevailing inequalities and to advance further in democratic capacity building.
V. Conclusions: Towards Secular Democracy
The most beneficial outcome of Lebanon’s consociational democracy is that it allowed
for levels of freedom and civil rights that placed Lebanon well ahead of other Arab
countries. Nonetheless, the Lebanese experience demonstrates that neither
consociationalism nor relatively high per capita income and rapid economic development
are sufficient guarantees against the onset of domestic conflicts in developing countries
with significant social or religious divisions. This is especially the case when such
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countries are vulnerable to destabilizing or negative regional influences from ongoing
conflicts and non-democratic neighboring regimes. Under such conditions,
consociationalism may serve a useful purpose, but only as a temporary political
arrangement towards a more viable political system. The ultimate objective must be to
shield the country against destabilizing external factors through social cohesion building.
Lebanon has not accomplished this objective.
The qualitative analysis of our paper shows how external factors, namely the Arab-Israeli
conflict but also the prevalence of highly autocratic regimes in the region dragged
Lebanon into a maelstrom of political mistrust and uncertainty. Politics, which is
supposed to become a positive sum game, was increasingly perceived as a zero-sum
game. Yet, our empirical exercise has also shown that Lebanon’s consociational model
has failed to create a more equal economic opportunity society and that from a cross-
sectional perspective, unequal opportunities are a highly robust predictor of armed
conflict. Whether Lebanon could have prevented the civil war if it had had a substantially
more equal society is, in light of the country’s exposure to adverse geoeconomic and
geopolitical influences, difficult to answer. There is, however, little doubt that its
vulnerability to outside–intervening factors would have been much less.
As vulnerability to destabilizing external interventions has been one of Lebanon’s major
weaknesses, it follows that the objectives of any political reform must be to strengthen its
ability to shield itself from the combined influences of sectarian divisions and external
interventions. In our view, the move towards a secular multiparty democracy provides the
most appropriate conditions for a stable political system and sustained development for
Lebanon. The case of Lebanon has shown that sectarianism has cemented initial
inequalities rather than helped to overcome them. Redirecting political leadership away
from de facto intra- towards inter-sectarian political accountability will promote better
governance, improved redistributive policies, and strengthen Lebanon’s immunity against
domestic conflicts.
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Lebanon is not yet ready to adopt a completely secular system. The initiation of a
transitional phase of reforms that would eventually lead to a fully-fledged secular
democracy is necessary. This process entails the resolution of a number of national issues
that range from the redefinition of the economic constitution and the completion the
division of power to personal status laws, electoral reforms, and deconfessionalization of
political and public institutions. As Lebanon is famous for its economic entrepreneurship,
it remains to be hoped that political entrepreneurship will eventually follow to resolve
Lebanon’s trap of consociationalism.
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